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COMMENTS
A NON-CONFLICT APPROACH TO THE FIRST
AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES
INTRODUCTION
In 1963, the United States government completed construction of
Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River. The water slowly began to
back up behind the dam creating the immense expanse of Lake Powell
from what had once been desert.' That desert area had a special signif-
icance to the Navajo Indians-it was the site of important shrines and
the home of various Navajo deities.2 Native traditions taught that if
humans tampered with the area, the Indian prayers would not be heard
by the gods and would no longer be efficacious in preventing evil and
disease. In addition, the presence of tourists, who now came by boat to
visit the once isolated Rainbow Bridge, prevented the Indians from
practicing ceremonials essential to their religion.' To protect their place
of worship, the Navajos brought suit in Badoni v. Higginson,4 arguing
that the government actions infringed upon the practice of their native
religion and thereby violated the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment.5 What the tribe demanded, in the name of religious freedom, was.
preferential use of the government land and resources."
The Badoni court dealt with the Navajo claim by posing a conflict
between the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amend-
' Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 174-76 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 954 (1981).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
' The first amendment proscriptions begin with religion: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
." U.S. CoNsr. amend. I.
Both Badoni and Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, No. 81-0481 (D.D.C. June 12,
1981) (available Dec. 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file), involved other
claims and issues not dealt with in this Comment. For example, in Badoni, plaintiffs
claimed that in impounding water in Lake Powell, the government had drowned some
of the plaintiffs' gods and therefore violated their free exercise rights. Plaintiffs also
contended that the failure to provide an environmental impact statement was a violation
of 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335 (1976). Badoni, 638 F.2d at 176. In Hopi Indian Tribe, in
addition to the free exercise claim, plaintiffs brought suit under the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (Supp. IV 1980), the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976), the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1543 (1976), and other statutes.
(1175)
1176 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ment.' The Tenth Circuit recognized, at least implicitly, the validity of
the free exercise claims and the burden placed upon the native reli-
gion,' but argued that any government action to correct such a burden
Badoni is representative of the kinds of problems faced by numerous Native
American groups whose religious lives have been disrupted by government land and
resource development policies. The report accompanying the American Indian Reli-
gious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter cited as AIRFA],
refers to the problem of unthinking government policies and the havoc that those poli-
cies wreaked on Native American religions. "[A] lack of U.S. governmental policy has
allowed infringement in the practice of native traditional religions." H.R. REP. No.
1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978). "[I]t appears that in nearly all cases the infringe-
ments which have occurred have not resulted from an express Federal policy, but
rather from a lack of policy at the Federal level." Id. at 4.
For other cases in which Native American groups have bought suit to prevent
infringements due to government land management policies, see Sequoyah v. T.V.A.,
620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982); Hopi
Indian Tribe v. Block, No. 81-0481, slip op. (D.D.C. June 12, 1981) (available Dec. 1,
1982, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
The free exercise claim in Badoni, however, is somewhat unusual. Free exercise
claims ordinarily involve a situation in which a government dictate compels an individ-
ual to violate his beliefs, see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 305 (1972) (state law
requiring compulsory high school education unconstitutional as applied to Amish);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (state law requiring
all students to salute the flag unconstitutional), or imposes some cost on adherence to a
particular religious belief, see, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (state
unemployment law denying benefits to Jehovah's Witness who terminates his job be-
cause of religious beliefs unconstitutional); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1966)
(state Sunday closing laws upheld as applied to merchants who closed on Saturdays for
religious reasons); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (state unemployment law
denying benefits to Seventh Day Adventist unavailable for Saturday work unconstitu-
tional). The Badoni situation, in contrast, did not force any individual to make a choice
of conscience between his religion and the law. Members of the tribe were permitted
access to the sacred areas along with the rest of the public, and no attempt was made to
prevent the performance of religious ceremonies. The tribe claimed, however, that the
opening of the land to the public in itself desecrated sacred areas and the presence of
tourists denied the religious practitioners the privacy necessary to perform religious
rituals. 638 F.2d at 177. Similar claims have been raised in a number of other cases.
See, e.g., Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), in which leaders of two
Indian nations objected to state development of a park area containing Bear Butte, a
geological structure sacred to the tribes. Plaintiffs objected to the building of roads,
bridges, and access facilities and complained that the presence of tourists disturbed
them in their religious exercises. See also Sequoyah v. T.V.A., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.
1980) (Cherokees brought suit to enjoin the proposed impoundment of a reservoir
which would flood land alleged to be sacred to the tribal religion); Hopi Indian Tribe
(tribes objected to the recreational development of the San Francisco Peaks in Arizona
on the grounds that such development desecrated sacred areas).
As this Comment went to press, the Northern District of California, in a case
similar to Badoni, ruled that "[a]ctions compelled by the Free Exercise Clause do not
violate the Establishment Clause." Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Pe-
terson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 597 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (enjoining the government from har-
vesting timber and constructing a road on Indian ceremonial land).
8 Badoni, 638 F.2d at 178. Compare Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 794
(D.S.D. 1982) and Sequoyah v. T.V.A., 620 F.2d 1159, 1165 (6th Cir. 1980) in which
the courts directly denied the validity of the free exercise claims. In Hopi Indian Tribe
v. Block, No. 81-0481 (D.D.C. June 12, 1981) (available Dec. 1, 1982, on LEXIS,
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would violate the establishment clause.'
The case raises a vexing "conflict" between the religion clauses of
the first amendment, a conflict which has been discussed extensively by
commentators 0 and mentioned by courts," but has never been dealt
with by the Supreme Court in a manner that would afford firm and
consistent guidance to lower courts.
It is difficult to determine what constitutes an establishment clause
violation when the government acts in response to a free exercise
claim-do the two clauses conflict and, if so, how should that conflict
be resolved? 12 This Comment argues that the conflict is illusory. The
Genfed Library, Dist. file), the court, while explicitly denying the first amendment
violation, admitted implicitly that the government action had at least some "indirect"
effect on the religion.
9Badoni, 638 F.2d at 178-79. See also Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, No. 81-0481,
slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. June 12, 1981) (available Dec. 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Dist. file), where the court used this as an alternative argument.
'0 See infra notes 43, 61, & 65-75 and accompanying text.
a See infra notes 39-64 and accompanying text.
These questions have implications as well for testing the constitutionality of the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (Supp. IV 1980), the
avowed purpose of which specifically is to protect the religious freedom of Indian
tribes:
On and after August 11, 1978, it shall be the policy of the United
States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of
freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Hawaiians, including but not lim-
ited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom
to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.
Id. Section 2 of AIRFA, Pub. L. No. 95-341, § 2, 92 Stat. 469, 470 (1978) (omitted
from the U.S.C. as executed) provided that:
The President shall direct the various Federal departments, agencies, and
other instrumentalities responsible for administering relevant laws to eval-
uate their policies and procedures in consultation with native traditional
religious bodies in order to determine appropriate changes necessary to
protect and preserve native American religious cultural rights and
practices.
Compare that with the even more explicit California law:
No public agency, and no private party using or occupying public prop-
erty, or operating on public property. . . shall in any manner whatsoever
interfere with the free expression or exercise of Native American religion
as provided in the United States Constitution and the California Constitu-
tion ......
CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 5097.9 (West Supp. 1982).
In addition, various government regulations are premised precisely on the policy of
protecting Native American shrine areas. For example, the Initial Report Concerning
the Tennessee Valley Authority's Implementation of the Indian Religious Freedom Act
of 1978, reprinted in FEDERAL AGENCIES TASK FORCE, AMERICAN INDIAN RELI-
GIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT, app. B (Aug. 1979) [hereinafter cited as AIRFA RE-
PORT] stated:
Due to incidents of vandalism and collection of artifacts by unauthorized
persons, sensitive archeological sites are considered restricted areas and
1983]
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danger of that perceived conflict is that it allows the establishment
clause to be employed as an excuse to ignore religious claims since spe-
cial treatment to preserve a religion can be viewed as an unconstitu-
tional establishment of religion. Because in fact there is no conflict, the
establishment clause cannot be used to avoid an assessment of the valid-
ity of free exercise claims or to strike down such claims.
The Comment proposes a non-conflict approach to the religion
clauses of the first amendment. That approach reflects the underlying
values of the clauses and is supported by an analysis both of the politi-
cal reality in which the two clauses operate and of the dangers each
addresses. Briefly, free exercise claims will most often be raised to re-
move burdens from "minority" religions, while valid establishment
clause challenges will most frequently be raised in situations in which
the government has granted benefits to "majority" religions. It could be
said that the free exercise clause is "pro-minority" while the establish-
ment clause is "anti-majority.""3 The religion clauses are in a relation-
ship of logical priority-the free exercise issue must be addressed prior
to the establishment issue because the former involves questions of pur-
pose and effect that are central to reaching conclusions about the lat-
ter.1 ' Stated simply, government efforts to remedy a burden it has
may be fenced, posted, and patrolled for their protection....
However, procedures exist by which persons may be permitted to
enter a restricted area when there is a legitimate reason for their presence.
These procedures ...appear to be flexible enough to accommodate re-
quests for access to sacred sites by practitioners of native traditional
religions.
One of the National Park Service recommendations for compliance with AIRFA
was to "[i]ssue regulations governing appropriate decorum, and use and protection of
park resources associated with Native American traditional religious practices." Draft
Assessment of Compliance Requirements of P.L. 95-341 for the National Park Service,
at 7, reprinted in AIRFA REPORT, supra. As a result of this policy, the Park Services
issued regulations restricting access to the Hopi Salt Mine (an area considered sacred
by the Hopi tribe) located in the Grand Canyon. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ANNUAL OPERATING
REQUIREMENTS: GRAND CANYON (Dec. 1981); see also, e.g., Memorandum of the
U.S. Department of Energy, Mar. 30, 1979 and the Letter from the Director of the
Bureau of Land Management to the Associate Director, Indian Affairs (April 12,
1979), reprinted in AIRFA REPORT, supra, at app. B.
"3 That is not to say that the establishment clause is only intended to prohibit the
establishment of a national church or to prohibit the favoring of one sect over another,
a position that was firrhly rejected by the Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) and in subsequent cases, see, e.g., McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948). Instead, this Comment argues that groups in po-
litical power are most likely to violate the establishment clause when such a violation is
somehow to their own benefit; the majority group may attempt to establish its own
religion or all religions but will likely not take actions that have the purpose and effect
of establishing minority religions.
14 See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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placed on the free exercise of a "minority" religion cannot realistically
be viewed as having the purpose or primary effect of attempting to
establish religion.
This non-conflict approach protects the right to practice a minor-
ity religion; it does not permit valid free exercise claims to be dismissed
because of an illusory "conflict" with the establishment clause. Such an
approach is especially justified in situations involving Indian tribes be-
cause of their long history of religious and cultural persecution and
because of the nature of Indian religion itself.
Section I of this Comment describes the case at issue here. Section
II discusses the views of the Supreme Court and commentators con-
cerning the potential conflict between the two clauses. Section III shows
that the two clauses, if interpreted correctly, do not conflict and that the
application of the establishment clause test mandated by the Court can-
not be used to strike down a free exercise claim: Section IV summarizes
the conclusions of this Comment.
I. Badoni v. Higginson
This Comment will not directly address the merits of the free ex-
ercise claim raised in Badoni v. Higginson,15 but rather will argue that
the court failed to consider that claim because it incorrectly perceived a
conflict with the establishment clause. The interpretation of the estab-
lishment clause in this manner poses a particular threat to non-Judeo-
Christian religions, first, because such religious groups frequently lack
access to the political process to vindicate their claims and, second, be-
cause the groups in power are often unaware of the requirements of the
minority religion and the potential burdens created by government poli-
cies.1 6 Native American religions, because they differ in basic respects
I5 638 F.2d 172, 174-76 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
I' Unfortunately this ignorance of the nature of Indian religions was apparent in
the district court decision in Badoni, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977). The court
there stated that the plaintiff's interests were not "deep religious conviction[s], shared
by an organized group and intimately related to daily living." Id. at 645 (quoting Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972)). This finding was based on the fact that
"the medicine men who allegedly conduct the religious rights. . . are not recognized
by the Navajo Nation as such. Also, the training of these medicine men has not been
tribally organized or carried out, and took place years ago." The court further argued
that, because the ceremonies at Rainbow Bridge were held infrequently and sporadi-
cally, the Monument did not have "anything approaching deep, religious significance."
An attempt by counsel to explain that the "Navajo ceremonies . . . are not periodic
ceremonies . . . [but] are performed when needed, and requested by an individual or
family," was dismissed as insufficient by the court. Id. at 645-46. The ethnocentrism of
the court's opinion hardly needs to be pointed out. The Tenth Circuit ignored this
finding and simply assumed the validity of the religious interests. Badoni, 638 F.2d at
177 n.4.
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from Western religions,' 7  are particularly susceptible to such
infringements.18
Recent free exercise claims raised by Indians have involved dis-
putes over government regulations permitting the desecration of sacred
areas now under government control. Several major lawsuits have been
brought, including the one discussed in this Comment, since the enact-
ment of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), which
recognized the protection of shrines as an area of specific concern."9 In
'7 Indian tribes lack the distinctions present in Western societies between religion
and culture or between the religious and the secular. For a discussion of the symbiotic
relationship between Native American religion and culture, see Note, Native Ameri-
cans and the Free Exercise Clause, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1509, 1510 (1977). The reli-
gions are not "commemorative"-they do not memorialize past events (such as a found-
ing) and do not incorporate a set of established truths, dogmas, and creeds. Instead they
are based on the perpetuation of rituals and ceremonies, each with a specific purpose.
The ceremonies are to be performed in a set manner, often at a particular location, and
any alterations can bring great harm to the well-being of the people. AIRFA REPORT,
supra note 12, at 10. The rituals, and in fact the entire religion, are closely tied to
sacred places and substances and to the land: The destruction of a sacred site harms not
only the Indian religion, but the community and culture as well, and such actions can
cause a serious disorientation of the society. For a general discussion of the nature of
Native American religions and the relationship to sacred areas, see NYC Announcer,
Indian Religious Freedom Campaign, printed in AMERICANS BEFORE COLUMBUS: A
PUBLICATION OF THE NATIONAL INDIAN YOUTH COUNCIL, SPECIAL EDITION
(Spring 1982), at 1 [hereinafter cited as NIYCJournal].
18 Indian religion cases have most commonly involved free exercise claims over the
use of peyote and protected species in religious rituals and over the wearing of long
hair as an expression of religious belief. Several state courts have exempted Native
American religion from the general restrictions on peyote use. E.g., State v. Whit-
tingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974);
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, .394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). In the hair
length controversies, most of which arose in the context of prisons or schools, the lower
courts have been divided, often over the problem of what constitutes a "religious" prac-
tice and over the extent of first amendment protection given to hair length. Compare
New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.) (rejecting free speech and free
exercise arguments concerning the wearing of long hair in school), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1097 (1973) with Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975) (accepting a
free exercise argument concerning the wearing of long hair by Indian prisoners).
The protected species cases have involved the use of animals and animal parts
essential to Native American religious ceremonies. The killing of these animals is often
either regulated by the government or directly forbidden because they are endangered
species. See, e.g., Frank v. Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (moose found to be
central to religious ritual). For a discussion of the protected species cases, see Note,
supra note 17, at 1530-33. The problem of federal restrictions on the use of substances,
including both peyote and protected species, was specifically mentioned as an area of
concern in the House Report accompanying AIRFA, H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-3 (1978); see also 124 CONG. REC. 21,444 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Udall).
In all of these areas there have been inconsistencies among the jurisdictions, often based
on the questions of what constitutes a religion and what criteria should be used to
balance individual interest in free exercise against state interest in regulation. Note,
supra note 17, at 1534.
19 See H.R. REP. NO. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1978); AIRFA REPORT,
supra note 12, at 13; 124 CONG. REC. 21,444 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Udall).
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all of these suits, the Indian religion claims were struck down.2"
Badoni v. Higginson" involved allegations by individual members
of the Navajo Tribe, and by three chapters of the Navajo Nation,2" that
the operation of Glen Canyon Dam, built pursuant to congressional
authorization, violated plaintiffs' rights under the free exercise clause of
the first amendment.23 After completion of the dam in 1963, water
backed up behind the dam, forming Lake Powell, and by 1970 the lake
entered the Rainbow Bridge National Monument, a 160 acre tract of
federally owned land which is surrounded by the Navajo reservation.
Within the National Monument is Rainbow Bridge, a great sandstone
arch 309 feet high, which, along with a nearby spring and prayer spot,
has, central importance to the religious beliefs of the Navajo.
2 4
By 1977, the water was over twenty feet deep directly under the
Briage. Prior to the creation, of Lake Powell, the Bridge had been in a
relatively inaccessible and deserted area. The creation of the lake pro-
vided access to the Monument, and tourists began to visit on tour boats
and private pleasure boats, encouraged by government construction of
docking facilities near the Bridge. 5 The plaintiffs believed that if
humans altered the earth in the area of the Bridge, plaintiffs' prayers
would not be heard by the gods and their ceremonies would be ineffec-
tive in preventing evil and disease.2" The court found that the develop-
ment interfered with the practice of the Navajo religion: "Tourists vis-
iting the sacred area have desecrated it by noise, litter and defacement
of the Bridge itself. Because of the flooding and the presence of tourists,
plaintiffs no longer hold ceremonies in the area of the Bridge.")
27
Under the free exercise aspect of the suit, the plaintiffs claimed
that, by allowing and encouraging tourists to visit the area, the govern-
ment had permitted desecration of a sacred spot and prevented the
Recently, the recognition of the urgency of the still existing threat to Native Amer-
ican religions has spurred efforts by the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC) to
begin a nationwide campaign for American Indian Religious Freedom. Among the most
prominent goals of the campaign are efforts to preserve Indian sacred sites on federal
land and to support the rights of Indians to worship free of intrusion at their tradi-
tional sites. NIYC Journal, supra note 17, at 1-3.
20 See Sequoyah v. T.V.A., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980); Crow v. Gullet, 541
F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982); Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, No. 81-0481 (D.D.C. June
12, 1981) (available Dec. 1, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file).
21 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
22 Id. at 175.
23 Id. at 175-76.
24 Id. at 177.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 175.
27 Id. at 177.
19831
1182 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:1175
plaintiffs from performing their rituals. 8 They requested that the gov-
ernment take. steps-such as prohibiting consumption of beer at the
Monument-to prevent desecration of the area, and they further re-
quested the government to close "the Monument on reasonable, notice
when religious ceremonies are to be held there."2 9
The court denied both requests. While admitting the difficulty of
performing sacred ceremonies when surrounded by tourists," the court
asserted that any government corrective action would be a violation of
the establishment clause: "What plaintiffs seek in the name of the Free
Exercise Clause is affirmative action by the government which impli-
cates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." 1 The court
then applied the establishment clause test mandated in School District
of Abington v. Schempps2 which specifies that government action does
not violate the establishment clause if the purpose and primary effect of
the action are secular and neither advance nor inhibit religion."S Using
this analysis, the court concluded that the "[i]ssuance of regulations to
exclude tourists completely from the Monument for the avowed pur-
pose of aiding plaintiffs' conduct of religious ceremonies would seem a
clear violation of the Establishment Clause."3
SB Id. at 176. As noted previously, Indian religions are centered around the per-
formance of rituals which must be done in a strictly specified manner and only with
appropriate participants. See supra note 17.
29 638 F.2d at 178.
So "We are mindful of the difficulties facing plaintiffs in performing solemn reli-
gious ceremonies in an area frequented by tourists." Id.
S1 Id.
32 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
3 Id.
" 638 F.2d at 179.
Badoni became an unfortunate example for the plaintiffs in Hopi Indian Tribe v.
Block, No. 81-0481 (D.D.C. June 12, 1981) (available Dec. 1, 1982, on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist. file). In that case, plaintiffs sued to prevent the federal govern-
ment from authorizing any further development of recreation facilities known as the
Arizona Snow Bowl in the Coconino National Forest in Arizona, an area that included
the San Francisco Peaks. Plaintiffs claimed that the operation and expansion of the
recreational facilities constituted "a violation of the plaintiffs' First Amendment guar-
antee of free exercise of religion due to the sacred nature of the mountains and their
centrality to both the Hopi and Navajo religions." Hopi Indian Tribe, slip op. at 2.
The nature of this claim was somewhat unusual, as the government did not pro-
hibit plaintiffs' religious exercises in the area of the Peaks nor deny them access to the
Peaks for purposes of gathering sacred substances. Instead, the claim was based on the
harm done to the religion through the desecration of a sacred area. The court rejected
this as a cognizable first amendment harm and claimed further that to recognize such a
claim "would clearly fly in the fact [sic] of the principles of the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment." Id. at 6. Again, the court applied a version of the establishment
clause test requiring a law: (1) to reflect a clearly secular purpose, (2) to have a pri-
mary effect that neither advanced nor inhibited religion, and (3) not to excessively en-
tangle the government in religious affairs. Id. at 6-7. The court viewed the discontinu-
ance of development in the Snow Bowl area as an action that would have a primarily
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It is this last aspect-the use of the establishment clause to avoid
reaching the free exercise claim-that is the focus of this Comment.35
religious purpose and effect and concluded that "[t]he plaintiffs do not have a constitu-
tional right under the First Amendment to require that the government manage this
property as a religious shrine for them; not only is it not required by the First Amend-
ment, but it is clearly prohibited by the Establishment Clause." Id. at 7. The claim
under the AIRFA was also rejected because the court held that the AIRFA only re-
quired agencies to "evaluate their policies and procedures with the aim of protecting
Indian religious freedoms . . . Here, the defendants have clearly complied with this
mandate." Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
Compare Badoni and Hopi Indian Tribe with Sequoyah v. T.V.A., 620 F.2d
1159 (6th Cir. 1980), where the court assessed the suit solely on the basis of the free
exercise claim and denied the legitimacy of that claim and Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 597 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("Actions com-
pelled by the Free Exercise Clause do not violate the Establishment Clause.").
35 The free exercise claim in itself is worthy of exploration, although it is beyond
the boundaries of this Comment. The claim involved the assertion by a religious group
of the exclusive right to use government resources set aside for the general public. Al-
though the government is willing to share these resources with the Native American
religion, the land development in itself desecrates a holy site and the entrance of the
general public violates the privacy assertedly needed to perform sacred rituals. Those
claims seem strong, given the Indians' prior possession and use of the land and the
possibly unconstitutional original taking of a sacred shrine. It is a more doubtful ques-
tion whether a religious group could lay claim to government land based on an occur-
rence that made the land holy after the government had legally acquired it. The stan-
dard for evaluating a free exercise claim was recently reiterated in United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) ("The state may justify a limit on religious liberty by show-
ing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.").
It is conceivable of course that such analysis was done silently in Badoni and that
a decision was reached that government interests outweighed the preservation of the
religious liberty of a minority. But such silent analysis under the guise of constitutional
authority is undesirable.
If the court had decided the case on the merits of the free exercise claim, several
scenarios would have been possible. Had the court ruled that there was no infringe-
ment, the tribe would be free to bring later suits based on subsequent and possibly
more severe incidents of infringement. Other Indian tribes in different circumstances
could still bring suit and realistically hope that the courts would remedy any serious
burdens on their religion. On the other hand, had the court decided that there was an
infringement, but one justified by a compelling government interest, the tribe could
then appeal to the public, lobby Congress, or form coalitions pressuring the government
to reassess its priorities. (In a sense there is evidence that Congress had already per-
formed this evaluation and decided in favor of Indian freedom of religion. See supra
note 12.) But since the court found that the establishment clause forbids adjustments to
the Indians' requests, it foreclosed (for the Navajo and other tribes) further legal or
political recourse. In fact, the decision could be read to suggest that any government
accommodations already made to native religion are unconstitutional. The Badoni court
stated:
Plaintiffs cite the Park Service's proposed guidelines for use of Grand
Canyon National Park, which prohibit entry on certain sacred Indian reli-
gious sites. They also cite the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
... . But we do not have before us the constitutionality of those laws or
regulations or of any action taken by defendants in alleged violation of
them.
638 F.2d at 180.
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That constitutional "blockade" of the free exercise claim suggests there
is no recourse for the religious minority to the political process since
any government action to remove impediments to the religious practices
of the Navajo people could be viewed as a constitutional violation. In
fact, it could well be argued that congressional and agency actions
taken to protect Indian religious freedom have already violated the es-
tablishment clause.
Badoni, then, is the starting point for investigating the relationship
between the religion clauses of the first amendment.
II. THE PERCEIVED CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RELIGION CLAUSES
A. The Viewpoint of the Court
Both the Supreme Court and commentators have criticized the in-
consistency and murkiness of the decisions analyzing the religion
clauses of the first amendment. "[T]he line of separation [of church and
state], far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable bar-
rier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." 6
That inconsistency has been blamed both on the language of the reli-
gion clauses37 and on the tendency of the Justices to issue statements of
unwarranted breadth. 8
The inconsistency is particularly marked when the Court ad-
dresses the "conflict" or "tension" between the free exercise and the
establishment clauses. That conflict is most frequently perceived when
the government exempts religious groups from laws of general applica-
bility (such as unemployment requirements, compulsory education,
etc.). These exemptions, required by the free exercise clause, are some-
times viewed as a violation of the establishment clause of the first
amendment. The Court and individual Justices have taken three sepa-
rate and contradictory viewpoints on the relationship between the two
clauses: (1) there is no conflict; (2) the two clauses conflict, but that
conflict is resolved in favor of the establishment clause; and (3) the con-
flict is resolved in favor of the free exercise clause.
36 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
37 Id. at 612.
11 "The considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives
from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on aspects of these
clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as
general principles." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). See also Kur-
land, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96 (1961);
infra note 40 and accompanying text.
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1. No Conflict
An explicit statement of the no conflict approach came from Jus-
tice Rutledge in his dissent in Everson v. Board of Education: "'Estab-
lishment' and 'free exercise' were correlative and coextensive ideas, rep-
resenting only different facets of the single great and fundamental
freedom." 9 More recently, Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court for
having created the tension between the clauses through unnecessarily
broad interpretations. He suggested that a narrow reading of the
clauses would eliminate any perceived conflict.' The difference be-
tween the non-conflict approach this Comment will suggest and Justice
Rehnquist's non-conflict approach is that the former does not require a
narrow interpretation of the freedoms secured by the free exercise
clause. 1
In certain instances, the Court has appeared to recognize a poten-
tial conflict, but then dismissed it as nonexistent, without expressly dis-
cussing whether such conflicts do in fact exist or how they are to be
handled. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, the Court simply stated
that the exemption from unemployment compensation requirements
granted to a Seventh-Day Adventist did not foster "the 'establishment'
of the Seventh-Day Adventist religion."'
' 2
One commentator has suggested that in various cases the Court
avoids the issue of conflict without ever resolving it.4' He cites as an
example Walz v. Tax Commission," a case in which the Court held
that tax exemptions for churches did not violate the establishment
clause without reaching the question of whether free exercise mandated
39 330 U.S. 1, 40 (1947).
40 Although the Court . . recognizes the "tension" between the two
Clauses, it does little to help resolve that tension or to offer meaningful
guidance to other courts which must decide cases like this on a day-by-day
basis. Instead, it simply asserts that there is no Establishment Clause vio-
lation here and leaves the tension between the two Religion Clauses to be
resolved on a case-by-case basis. . . . I believe that the "tension" is
largely of this Court's own making, and would diminish almost to the
vanishing point if the Clauses were properly interpreted.
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 722 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist went on to suggest that the free exercise clause should not be
applied to indirect burdens, id. at 722-23, while the establishment clause should hot
invalidate "governmental assistance which does not have the effect of 'inducing' reli-
gious belief, but instead merely 'accommodates' or implements an independent religious
choice. . . ." Id. at 727. See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414-17 (1963)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
41 See supra note 40; infra notes 77-137 and accompanying text.
42 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
43 Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of the First
Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REV. 561, 571-75 (1980).
44 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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such exemptions. In TWA, Inc. v. Hardison," the Court was called
upon to decide the constitutionality of legislation requiring employers to
make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of their em-
ployees.46 The Court failed to reach the question of whether Congress
could pass provisions to protect free exercise without violating the es-
tablishment clause, and instead decided the matter on statutory
grounds.
47
2. Conflict Resolved in Favor of the Establishment Clause
Several defendants in establishment clause cases have advanced the
argument that denial of aid to religion violates free exercise. Such a
claim was made in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 8 in
which the Court held unconstitutional a law providing tuition grants
for students attending church schools. The Court rejected the claim that
tuition grants were necessary to promote the free exercise of religion,
stating that "this Court repeatedly has recognized that tension inevita-
bly exists between the Free Exercise and the Establishment clauses
• . . and that it may often not be possible to promote the former with-
out offending the latter." 9
Similarly, in School District of Abington v. Schempp,50 the Court
struck down state-mandated school prayer as violative of the establish-
ment clause, despite the claim that the law protected the free exercise of
the majority: "While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use
of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never
meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice
its beliefs."'"
Justice Stewart, in his concurrence in Sherbert v. Verner, was
highly critical of the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause
in cases such as Schempp. He argued that "legitimate claims under the
4- 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
48 Two other reasonable accommodation employment cases have reached the Su-
preme Court since 1970. Both were affirmed by an equally divided Court with no
written opinion and thus have little precedential value. See Cummins v. Parker Seal
Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), affd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 429
U.S. 65 (1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 903 (1977), rev'd on statutory grounds, 561 F.2d
659 (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (The Sixth Circuit reversed its earlier holding to
conform with the statutory interpretation in TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977)); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), affd per
curiam by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
4 432 U.S. at 70.
48 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
49 Id. at 788.
50 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
51 Id. at 226.
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Free Exercise Clause will run into head-on collision with the Court's
insensitive and sterile construction of the Establishment Clause.
5
1
2
Stewart reasoned that under such construction, the establishment clause
required the state to deny the claim for unemployment compensation
when the refusal to work was based on a religious creed.53 In effect, he
argued, the Court had backed itself into a position where the establish-
ment clause required the denial of legitimate free exercise claims.
3. Conflict Resolved in Favor of the Free Exercise Clause
In contrast to the previous two positions, the Court, when address-
ing free exercise claims, has frequently held that the elimination of a
burden on free exercise (such as the creation of an exemption from a
law of general applicability) does not "establish" religion, despite the
"benefit" to the religious individual." Individual Justices have sug-
gested that when a conflict does exist, the free exercise claim must dom-
inate.5 They cite a number of situations in which denying benefits to
religion would be considered a violation of free exercise, such as the
provision of chaplains in the military and in prisons, religious services
in federal hospitals, and school lunches provided to private as well as
public school students.5 Often this viewpoint is expressed as one of
"accommodation" of government to religion, an accommodation which
"can hardly be characterized as sponsorship or active involvement," but
which "'reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neu-
trality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent that
involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object
of the Establishment Clause to forestall.' ,,57 Such an accommodation is
52 374 U.S. 398, 414 (1963) (footnote omitted).
53 Id. at 415.
" See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981), where the Court held
that the state could not deny unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who quit
his job because his religion forbade participation in the production of armaments. The
Court considered and rejected the suggestion that such an exemption might violate the
establishment clause and stated that the "benefit" to Thomas manifested nothing more
"than the tension between the two Religious Clauses which the Court resolved in
Sherbert."
5 "[Tihe logical interrelationship between the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses may produce situations where an injunction against an apparent establishment
must be withheld in order to avoid infringement of the rights of free exercise." School
Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 247 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). See
also id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring); TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 90
(1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-98 (1963) (Brennan, J., con-
curring); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437 n.1 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
57 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 n.22 (1972) (quoting Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963)). See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14
(1952) (implying that failure of the schools to permit release time for religious instruc-
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viewed as necessary to insure that government "neutrality" to religion
does not become government hostility to religion.
58
The accommodation theory recognizes the necessary interrelation-
ship between government and religion and permits government to ac-
commodate its institutions and programs to the religious interests of the
people.59 Most often accommodation is required when laws of general
applicability conflict with the free exercise of religious minorities.60 In
such situations, accommodation or "free exercise neutrality" is said to
permit and even require "the state to make special provision for reli-
gious interests in order to relieve them from both direct and indirect
burdens placed on the free exercise of religion by increased governmen-
tal regulation."6" Such a result is mandated by cases such as Sherbert v.
Verner,6 2 in which the Court exempted a Seventh-Day Adventist from
the requirement that she be available for work on Saturday in order to
qualify for unemployment compensation. The Court stated that such
accommodation does not violate the establishment clause because "the
extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with
Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the governmental obli-
gation of neutrality in the face of religious differences."6" In fact, the
Court found such accommodation to be not only permissible under the
establishment clause, but to be positively required by the free exercise
clause."
tion might be a free exercise violation and that the government must "accommodate"
spiritual needs). In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, the Court referred to this accommodation as
a kind of "benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without
sponsorship and without interference." 397 U.S. at 669.
'8 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
" See, e.g., Zorach, in which the Court upheld a New York law permitting public
schools to release pupils during school hours to attend religious instruction elsewhere.
For a general discussion of accommodation theory, see P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE
CONsTrrTrroN 67-75 (1964).
60 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), in which the Court held that
a state unemployment compensation law must accommodate those whose religious be-
liefs prevented them from working on Saturdays.
"I Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development:
Part I. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REv. 513, 518 (1968) [herein-
after cited as Giannella II].
82 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
" Id. at 409.
Id. at 410 ("Our holding today is ... that South Carolina may not constitu-
tionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his reli-
gious convictions respecting the day of rest."). See also id. at 415-16 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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B. The Viewpoint of the Commentators
Various attempts have been made by commentators to develop a
coherent theory that would explain the relationship between the two
religion clauses. One group of commentators asserts that a conflict be-
tween the two clauses, not likely perceived by the framers of the first
amendment, does exist, and has been exacerbated by increased govern-
ment action in areas of individual life.6 5 Once the conflict is admitted,
the clauses must then be reconciled. Both Giannella and Tribe assert
that the free exercise clause is supreme. 6 They believe that actions that
are "'arguably compelled' by free exercise" do not violate the establish-
ment clause.67 The state is permitted and sometimes required to make
special provision for religious interests to relieve them from burdens of
government regulation ("free exercise neutrality") and the establish-
ment clause does not compel exclusion of religious activities and as-
sociations from regulation when secular purposes justify inclusion ("po-
litical neutrality").68 Thus, religious associations must be given police
and fire protection equal to other voluntary associations, because exclu-
sion would be a form of government hostility to religion.69
Alternatively, several commentators agree that a conflict exists, but
argue that free exercise is supreme on the principle of "religious lib-
erty" that underlies both clauses.70 That position is similar to the
,' Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development:
Part L The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1389 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as Giannella I]. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), also asserted that the tension between the two clauses is of
relatively recent vintage and is at least in part an outgrowth of the recent increase in
social welfare legislation. Id. at 720-21.
" Giannella bases his argument on the perception that free exercise is premised
on a vital civil right while the establishment clause is premised on an outmoded eight-
eenth century political theory. Giannella I, supra note 65, at 1389. Tribe argues that
the supremacy of the free exercise claim "is the natural result of tolerating religion as
broadly as possible rather than thwarting at all costs even the faintest appearance of
establishent." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-7, at 833 (1978). His
argument is premised, at least in part, on the value of encouraging religious diversity
and pluralism, and a commitment to the "flourishing of conscience." Id. § 14-7, at 834.
11 L. TRIBE, supra note 66, § 14-4, at 822.
" Giannella II, supra note 61, at 518-19.
69 Id. at 519-22.
70 "A useful starting point is to recognize that religious liberty-broadly
conceived to include all varieties of religious belief and freedom of total
belief and nonbelief-is the central value served by both clauses. Whatever
else government may or may not do, it is required to respect religious
liberty. This means, first of all, that it must refrain from laws that restrict
the free exercise of religion or which discriminate on religious grounds in
the granting of rights or privileges, unless clearly defined policy grounds
warrant such discrimination."
P. KAUPER, supra note 59, at 77. See also Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neu-
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Court's "accommodation" approach: "An accommodation theory ...
recognizes that any principle of no-aid or neutrality derived from the
establishment limitation must yield in order to assure the full enjoy-
ment of religious liberty or to permit the legislature a discretionary au-
thority to implement this liberty.1
7 1
A second major group of commentators argues that any conflict
between the religion clauses is illusory. Kurland has stated that the two
clauses should be read "as a single precept that government cannot util-
ize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses
prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to
impose a burden." 75 Kurland's strict neutrality approach, not generally
accepted by the Court, would permit government to confer benefits on
religion as long as the benefits were part of a classification scheme that
naturally included religion within its boundaries, such as police and
fire protection.73 Exemptions from laws of general applicability, how-
ever, would be difficult to uphold since those exemptions would be
based on a religious classification.
Pfeffer argues forcefully for a unitary approach to the first amend-
ment, each clause requiring and protecting the other: "Nothing in
American constitutional history or tradition justifies an apportionment
of values between disestablishment and freedom or indeed the dichot-
omy itself. The struggle for religious liberty and for disestablishment
were parts of the same single evolutionary process that culminated in
the First Amendment."'" The apparent conflicts between the two
clauses are generally conflicts within free exercise itself-between free
exercise and government regulation.
75
trality, 20 U. CHi. L. REV. 426, 428, 432-33 (1953).
71 P. KAuPER, supra note 59, at 71.
71 Kurland, supra note 38, at 5-6.
78 Justice Harlan, concurring in Walz, 397 U.S. at 696, viewed this neutrality
principle as requiring an equal protection mode of analysis. Legislation that inciden-
tally benefitted religion was valid if the class benefitted was so broad that religion fell
within its natural perimeters. (The Court in Walz upheld the validity of state property
tax exemptions for charitable organizations that included churches.)
74 L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 122 (1953).
7' For example, the supporters of aid to parochial schools maintain that such aid
is required by the free exercise clause since poor families must send their children to
public school and will therefore have to forego the religious training they wish their
children to receive. Opponents maintain that such aid would violate the establishment
clause. This apparent conflict, however, is not one of competing constitutional val-
ues-that is, constitutionally mandated support versus constitutionally forbidden sup-
port-but rather is between constitutionally mandated free exercise and statutorily
mandated compulsory attendance laws. "[Tihe conflict is not between nonestablishment
and free exercise, but rather exclusively within the area of free exercise. Resolution of
that conflict might require the Court to hold that compulsory school attendance laws
are unconstitutional . . . but it would in no way require state support of parochial
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C. Summary
While the Supreme Court has frequently interpreted the establish-
ment clause in a manner that accommodates the demands of free exer-
cise, it has done so without providing a coherent theory of precisely
how the clauses are to be related. Most commentators have attempted
to reconcile the clauses by looking for underlying themes and accommo-
dation between the two clauses, tending toward the supremacy of the
free exercise clause in the face of an alleged establishment violation.
It is the thesis of this Comment that a non-conflict approach is the
most appropriate way to unify the clauses, and furthermore that such
an approach is consistent with a liberal reading of the free exercise
clause's protection of religion. That approach can be assimilated under
current establishment clause doctrine and the three-part test mandated
by the Court," and is justifiable as upholding the underlying purposes
of the establishment clause.
III. NON-CONFLICT APPROACH TO THE RELIGION CLAUSES
A. Rationale for the Non-Conflict Approach
The following discussion will first examine the underlying values
of the establishment clause and demonstrate that the correction of a free
exercise infringement does not adversely affect these values. The Com-
ment will then show that the two clauses are intended to respond to
different types of dangers which might result from a failure of the po-
litical process to protect freedom of religion, so that when one danger is
corrected (the burden on the "minority"), the second will not occur
(undue benefit to the "majority"). Finally, the Comment will show that
the clauses are in a relationship of logical priority-the free exercise
analysis is a prerequisite for determining whether the purpose and ef-
fect of government action impermissibly violate the establishment
clause.
1. The Underlying Purposes of the Establishment Clause
There is some consensus of opinion that the original purposes of
the establishment clause were quite narrow-to prevent Congress from
interfering with state establishments of religion, and to guard against
the establishment of a national church or sect with the concomitant per-
schools." Id. at 575.
76 See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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secution of religious minorities . By the same token, however, there is
an equal consensus that such historical understandings of the establish-
ment clause are no longer useful in an era in which government in-
trudes more and more into individual life, and in which the number
and diversity of religious minorities have increased dramatically."'
The Court, for the past fifty years, has given a broad interpreta-
tion to the purposes of the establishment clause.
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one reli-
gion over another. . . .In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect "a wall of separation between church and state.""
While this ringing statement of the strict separation or no-aid the-
ory has been tempered into the accommodation approach, 0 the Court
consistently has reiterated the view that the establishment clause forbids
more than just the establishment of a single sect, but rather is directed
toward any undue involvement of government with religion." Underly-
ing this view are the central values inherent in the establishment clause.
That clause protects religious freedom of choice, proscribing all govern-
77 See P. KAUPER, supra note 59, at 46; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319
(1952)(Black, J., dissenting); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1947). But
compare Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson where he states that the purpose of the
establishment clause was "not to strike merely at the official establishment of a single
sect, creed or religion. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every
form of public aid or support for religion." 330 U.S. at 31-32.
78 See Brennan's concurrence in Schempp for an analysis of why "[a] too literal
quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers" is both "futile and misdirected." 374
U.S. at 237 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Giannella I, supra note 65, at 1383.
'9 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
So In fact, the Court itself in Everson allowed the challenged aid (reimbursement
for bus transportation to parochial schools), thus indicating that the strict no-aid theory
may have been no more than a rhetorical device. This inconsistency prompted Justice
Jackson's famous quote:
In fact, the undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncompro-
mising separation of Church from State, seem utterly discordant with its
conclusion yielding support to this commingling in educational matters.
The case which irresistibly comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is
that of Julia who, according to Byron's reports, "whispering 'I will ne'er
consent,'-consented."
330 U.S. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
8' See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 219 (1963); Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 211 (1948).
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ment favoritism in matters of belief and religious expression, and pre-
vents government from aiding religion in any way that would give reli-
gious belief the imprimatur of government (and have a corrupting effect
on individual matters of conscience).8 2 The advance of a religion should
come only from the voluntary support of its followers; there should be a
free competition of faiths to promote the diversity desirable in our soci-
ety.88 Thus, government may neither directly legislate matters of belief
nor indirectly utilize "'the prestige, power, and influence' of a public
institution to bring religion into the lives of citizens."'"
For the framers, establishment "connoted sponsorship, financial
support and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."85
The modern understanding is somewhat broader. In general, there can
be no undue involvement of government with religion, an involvement
measured by the impact government participation has on freedom of
belief and conscience,88 by the danger of government placing an official
stamp of approval on religion,87 or, in particular, by the threat of polit-
ical divisiveness and strife along religious lines.88 The establishment
clause seeks to prevent any entanglement of church and state that
would tend to "destroy government and degrade religion."8"
If those are the underlying values of the establishment clause,90
and the dangers to be avoided are government coercion of religious be-
lief and excessive government entanglement with the working of reli-
52 See Giannella II, supra note 61, at 517; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
466 (1961) (The establishment clause proscribes government legislation in the area of
"man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some transcendental idea and man's expres-
sion in action of that belief or disbelief.").
s3 See L. TRIBE, supra note 66, § 14-3, at 818; Giannella II, supra note 61, at
517; see also School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 228-29 (1963)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
" Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See
also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (government power, prestige, and finan-
cial support placed behind religion can exert indirect coercive pressure on religious
minorities); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Justice Frank-
furter discusses the impermissibility of having religious instruction on school property
during school hours because of the danger of the power and prestige of the school being
linked with religious training.).
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
p. KAuPER, supra note 59, at 77-78.
57 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962).
" Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 512 (1982); Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694, 698
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting); Gianella II, supra note 61, at 517.
69 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962); Note, Toward a Constitutional Defi-
nition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1056, 1058-59 (1978).
" For views of various commentators on these values, see L. TRIBE, supra note
66, § 14-3, at 818; Giannella II, supra note 61, at 517; Note, supra note 89, at 1058-
59.
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gion, then the correction of an impermissible infringement on free exer-
cise will not only not create or exacerbate those dangers, but will
affirmatively foster the values underlying the establishment clause. By
definition, when a free exercise violation has occurred (a significant
burden on the religion unjustified by a compelling state interest),"1 the
government has already impermissibly involved itself with religion in a
manner coercive of religious freedom. In Badoni v. Higginson,9 2 the
Navajos were prevented by government action (allowing tourists into a
Park area) from practicing their religion. If that action is unconstitu-
tional, subsequent government action restoring the religion to its previ-
ous position would neither coerce religious belief nor cause excessive
government entanglement; rather, such action would merely insure that
the Navajo are free to rely on their own beliefs.93
In correcting a free exercise violation, there is little danger that the
government will corrupt individual conscience or place its imprimatur
on the religion. Adherents of the religion are left free to choose whether
or not to practice their rituals. There should be little concern that many
Americans would adopt a particular religion merely because the gov-
ernment has created some exception for or extended some benefit to
that religion in an effort to remove a free exercise burden."
Similarly, the correction of a free exercise violation will not create
the danger of undue involvement of church and state. The existence of
an impermissible free exercise violation implies an already existing and
"' See infra note 119.
92 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981). Both the
original government taking of the land and the secondary development of the land could
arguably be viewed as free exercise violations.
S Government action under these circumstances could be viewed as analogous to
the remedy in a tort claim. Remedies are generally viewed as restoring the individual to
a position equivalent to his position prior to the injury. Similarly, the "religious rem-
edy" has both the purpose and the effect of restoring the religious group to its status
quo prior to the infringement. For the Navajo, that would imply a return to the situa-
tion in which they were free to enter the land and perform solemn rituals in private.
" In the Badoni situation in particular, because the Indian religions are of a
nonproselytizing nature and in fact often cannot permit outsiders to view or participate
in ceremonies, there is no danger to the general public of being induced to take on the
beliefs of the religion. Since, in effect, the government is acting to isolate the general
public from the religion, the force of the government would not "be placed behind the
tenets of one or of all orthodoxies." School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
222 (1963).
Even in situations involving groups of a more public and proselytizing bent, (i.e.,
Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh Day Adventists) it is somewhat far-fetched to assume
that correction of a free exercise violation would induce others to join the sect. For
example, even if the government allows Sabbatarians to receive unemployment benefits
although they are unable to work on Saturdays, few Americans would choose to become
Sabbatarians, thus sacrificing their ability to take jobs in return for the limited benefits
of unemployment.
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illegal relationship between church and state. In Badoni it could be
argued that government actions in taking over and then developing a
shrine area fostered an undue involvement with religion as measured
by the adverse impact on freedom of religious expression, the implica-
tion of government disrespect for or even disapproval of religion, and
the creation of political divisiveness along religious lines.95 In correcting
those violations, government would be withdrawing itself from what
was an initial entanglement with religion and increasing the separation
between church and state."
The entanglement issue requires some further analysis, however.
Although Badoni presents a case in which government action to foster
religious freedom-closing the park on reasonable notice for several
days each year-could arguably be considered only an insignificant de-
gree of entanglement, a more difficult situation would be presented
were the Indians to request the park to be closed on a weekly basis, or
perhaps more frequently, thus requiring the Park Service to police
those closings and even decide when requests were valid or not. In the
latter case, continual government action might be viewed as undue in-
volvement with religion, presenting a genuine clash of free exercise and
establishment. Such a clash, however, would be illusory. The original
act of entanglement was the government's initial action that infringed
on free exercise. It would seem specious to argue that further efforts of
the government to alleviate that burden and to extricate itself from un-
due involvement constitute excessive entanglement in violation of the
establishment clause. Under such circumstances, the real conflict, as
Pfeffer argued,9" is within free exercise, not between free exercise and
establishment-in this case, between the constitutionally mandated dis-
involvement with religion and the legislative policy of appropriation
and development of land. If the building of the Glen Canyon Dam was
a violation of the Indians' constitutional rights, then perhaps the only
satisfactory alternative under the hypothetical situation posited would
be to close off the area to tourists altogether or to return the land to the
Indians who vould be allowed to regulate the privacy of their own
ceremonials.
" Witness the statements of Indian leaders and their anger at what seems to be
the callous indifference of the government to the needs of religious minorities. See
"Message from Vine Deloria" in N1YCJournal, supra note 17, at 2.
" That view of government action to decrease or avoid entanglement was sug-
gested in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), in which the Court stated that
"[glranting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford an indirect eco-
nomic benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a lesser, involvement than taxing
them." Id. at 674-75 (emphasis added).
97 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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The non-conflict analysis applies in all situations where a free ex-
ercise claim has been raised and where government action can arguably
be viewed as an attempt to remedy or avoid the free exercise violation.
If the courts first evaluate the free exercise claim and determine that an
impermissible burden has been placed on religion, they are in effect
ascertaining a preexisting violation of the values of religious freedom.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,98 for example, the compulsory schooling laws
forced members of the Amish faith to choose between violating their
religious beliefs or disobeying government dictates. The removal of that
pressure did not lend government support to the Amish faith. Individu-
als were free to practice the religion or not, as they chose, and the value
of voluntary support of religion was fostered. Similarly, the government
acted to separate itself from religion by lessening the impact of govern-
ment dictates on religious belief, by refraining from implicitly express-
ing disapproval of those beliefs, and by lessening the threat of political
strife and divisiveness along religious lines. The Court concluded as
much when it stated: "The purpose and effect of such an exemption are
not to support, favor, advance, or assist the Amish, but to allow their
centuries-old religious society . . . to survive free from the heavy im-
pediment compliance with the Wisconsin compulsory-education law
would impose." 9
Alternatively, in situations where it appears that government ac-
tion violates the values underlying the establishment clause by advanc-
ing (or inhibiting) religious practice, the appropriate conclusion is not
that the establishment clause preempts free exercise, but rather that
such government action has not been shown to be necessary to correct
or ameliorate some other government infringement of religion. For ex-
ample, in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist °00 the court held
unconstitutional a law providing tuition grants for students attending
church schools and suggested (in answer to the claim that the grants
were merely intended to foster free exercise) that in certain circum-
stances the establishment clause must dominate free exercise claims.10 1
A preferable analysis would have been to state that no valid free exer-
cise claim had been advanced, and therefore that no conflict existed be-
tween the clauses.102 That is, since it was not argued that the compul-
*8 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 234 n.22.
10 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
101 Id. at 788-89. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
o2 See Tribe's study of cases involving release time for religious instruction in
which he distinguishes McCollum v. Board of Educ. 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invalidating
the use of school facilities for religious instruction during school time) from Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a program in which students were released
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sory public school education laws significantly burdened the free
exercise of religion in the absence of a compelling governmental inter-
est, the state law providing private school tuition grants was not en-
acted to cure a free exercise violation, and thus the case did not involve
a conflict between the clauses. I03
In sum, then, when a valid free exercise claim has been proven,
government action to remedy or avoid the violation will operate to pro-
mote the underlying goals of the establishment clause. When viewed in
the perspective of the underlying purposes of the establishment clause,
the two clauses cannot conflict.
2. The Political Process Argument
There can be no question that when the legislature acts to aid or
confer a benefit on religion, there must be some concern over whether
such action violates the establishment clause. Given political reality,
however, that concern should not lead to a finding of an establishment
clause violation in all such cases.'"l Legislatures are, for the most part,
comprised of representatives of the mainstream religions. It is unlikely
that they would pass laws burdening mainstream religions; it is much
more likely that laws will be passed that, intentionally or not, benefit
the majority and burden minority or nonmainstream religions.205 The
from public school classes to attend religious instruction off the school premises) on the
basis that in Zorach the program was "arguably compelled by free exercise," whereas
in McCollum it was not. L. TRIBE, supra note 66, § 14-5, at 823-25 (emphasis in
original).
103 The Court noted that the *state's purpose in enacting the private school tuition
grants was to maintain a healthy alternative to public education and to avoid any sig-
nificant increase in the number of nonpublic school pupils transferring to the already
financially troubled public schools. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 764-65. Thus, the purpose was
not to relieve any burden on free exercise caused by the compulsory education laws.
104 "The First Amendment does not prohibit practices which by any realistic mea-
sure create none of the dangers which it is designed to prevent .... ." School Dist. of
Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
105 Representative Udall made this point cogently in his remarks to the House
concerning passage of AIRFA:
Mr. Speaker, this Country is primarily a Christian country with a
large Jewish population and substantial numbers of people practicing va-
rious other European and Asian religions. Were we to consider legislation
which adversely impacted upon these religions and infringed upon the first
amendment right to the free exercise of religion, we would, from our own
knowledge and background be aware of that impact and would modify the
legislation to eliminate the offensive language.
But the traditional religions of the native American people are not
our religions and we are unaware of practices, rites, and ceremonials of
these religions. We have, in the past, enacted legislation where we have
unknowingly brought about the infringement of the religious rights of the
Indians.
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religion clauses of the first amendment protect against these tendencies,
the free exercise clause acting to unburden the minority religion, and
the establishment clause preventing undue benefit for the majority reli-
gion. Veiwed in this light the clauses do not conflict.
Should a minority religion become burdened, the free exercise
clause may mandate that the burden be alleviated. If the minority reli-
gion can persuade the legislature to act so as to relieve the burden, the
affirmative governmental action should not be deemed to violate the es-
tablishment clause, as long as such corrective action does not go beyond
restoring the minority religion to its position prior to the infringement.
The minority is merely avoiding an infringement that probably would
not be faced by the mainstream religions and the legislature is not act-
ing to benefit the religious majority. Thus, it is improper to hold, as did
the court in Badoni,1 " that affirmative governmental action to remove
a free exercise burden is barred by the establishment clause.107
Most free exercise cases have involved minority religions unable to
rely on the political process for protection of their religious rights.1 08
Legislative or judicial action to relieve the burden would not be neces-
sary had prior legislative action imposing the burden never taken place.
Thus, the action to relieve the burden merely serves to treat all reli-
gions equally. This basic goal is not new. As discussed earlier, the
Court in Sherbert v. Verner" held that the extension of unemploy-
ment benefits to those who refused to work on Saturdays did not foster
the establishment of the Seventh-Day Adventist religion; rather, it re-
flected the "governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of reli-
124 CONG. Rxc. 21,444 (1978).
106 638 F.2d at 178-79. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
107 A somewhat similar idea was expressed in a Note arguing for a dual definition
of the term religion-broad for free exercise purposes, narrow for establishment pur-
poses-as a way to avoid the conflict dilemma. Under that analysis, the existence of a
religion for establishment purposes depended on "(1) the power possessed by the fol-
lowers of a practice or belief and (2) the extent to which that practice or belief is
generally recognized as religious." Note, supra note 89, at 1086. The author recognized
that this definition may enable fringe religious groups to be aided without violating the
establishment clause but considered this not to be a problem because (1) the underlying
values of the establishment clause will not be harmed; (2) adherents of similar fringe
groups can demand equal treatment; and (3) recipients of aid will be members of small
and politically powerless groups which are unlikely to receive substantial benefits to
begin with. "Certainly the possibility that tiny, powerless, and unpopular minorities
will receive substantial benefits at the hands of the majority is far from the concern that
has traditionally triggered strict judicial scrutiny." Id. at 1088 n.144.
106 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Amish claim); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (Jehovah's Witness claim); TWA, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63 (1977) (Worldwide Church of God claim); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (Amish claim); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Seventh-Day Ad-
ventist claim); Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Jewish claim).
00 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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gious differences."' 10
Cases in which the establishment clause was properly used to in-
validate government actions can be divided into two groups: those in
which it was not shown that prior government action unduly burdened
the free exercise of religion, and those in which a free exercise violation
was present, but government action went beyond simply remedying the
violation. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist'" is an example
of those in the first group. In Nyquist, because it was not shown that
state education laws burdened the free exercise of religion, the action of
the legislature granting tuition reimbursements to parents who enrolled
their children in parochial schools was not taken to remedy a free exer-
cise violation. Since the government is not obligated to pay for religious
education, but only to provide public education, the action of the legis-
lature could either be viewed as inuring to its own perceived benefit in
promoting religion over nonreligion, or may have been the result of a
political coalition with the minority religion. Similarly, in School Dis-
trict of Abington v. Schempp,"12 since there was no underlying free ex-
ercise violation; the mandated school prayer in effect advanced religion
over nonreligion and benefitted the majority.
A comparison of Zorach v. Clauson"13 and McCollum v. Board of
Education'" nicely illustrates those cases that fall in the second group.
Both cases may have involved an underlying free exercise claim that
compulsory education interfered with the weekly religious instruction of
minority group children. (Had the group been a "majority" religion;
the political process would have protected religious exercise, perhaps by
originally insuring that compulsory education laws did not interfere
with religious instruction. Such protection already exists, in fact, since
no school systems hold classes on Sunday, a practice which would vio-
late the religious freedom of the majority.) In Zorach, the release time
program restored the position of the religious group to the status quo
prior to interference by the compulsory education laws."1 5 In contrast,
in McCollum, under the same implied free exercise claim, the state ac-
tion went beyond restoring the status quo and placed religion in a bet-
ter position than it would have been absent the compulsory education
laws (i.e. by providing public facilities and placing the power and pres-
tige of the school behind religious instruction)." 6 This analysis then
110 Id. at 409. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
a 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
112 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
113 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
114 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
115 343 U.S. at 313-15.
116 333 U.S. at 210.
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can reconcile the Zorach and McCollum decisions by positing an under-
lying free exercise violation in each that was appropriately remedied in
Zorach, but inappropriately remedied in McCollum.
In summary, the non-conflict approach assumes that appropriate
government action to remedy or avoid a free exercise violation is a
mandated concession that goes against the immediate interest of the ma-
jority and is necessary to restore the minority to some status quo ex-
isting prior to the free exercise violation. In neither situation (acting to
restore a burdened minority to its unburdened position or acting against
the self-interest of the majority) is there any serious danger of violating
the underlying values of the establishment clause.
1 17
3. Logical Priority
In recent cases involving establishment claims, the Court has con-
sistently invoked a three-part test that evaluates a government action by
determining whether it reflects a secular purpose, whether it has a pri-
mary secular effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and
whether there is excessive entanglement of government with religion.' 18
Because this test involves an assessment of both purpose and effect, it
can only be answered after any free exercise claims have been evalu-
ated." 9 The free exercise assessment provides data concerning the gov-
117 The most difficult and most crucial aspect of the analysis will be to determine
if government action is genuinely directed in response to a valid free exercise claim.
When government acts in a fashion that appears to be favoring minority religions,
there are three possible interpretations: (1) the action is in response to a shift in politi-
cal power, perhaps because a coalition of minority groups have gained control of the
political process; (2) the action reflects the favored position of one minority group, thus
creating an equal protection problem (for example, if the government allowed the
Amish to be exempted from compulsory education laws but denied the privilege to
other groups); and (3) the action is in response to a valid free exercise claim. The non-
conflict analysis, therefore, does not suggest that all government actions on behalf of
minority groups will not violate the establishment clause, but only those actions in
response to a valid free exercise claim.
.1. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 510 (1982); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977);
Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 358 (1975); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973); Tilton v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
The Supreme Court has found an impermissible purpose very infrequently. See
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (state law requiring posting Ten
Commandments on the wall of public school classrooms found to have religious pur-
pose); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968) (prohibition on teaching of
evolution in schools found to have a religious purpose).
19 A government action can be upheld (1) if there is found to be no infringement
on the free exercise of religion; or (2) if there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude
to override any free exercise infringement. For a statement of this standard see United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972);
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ernment purpose-to correct an illegal burden on religion, to protect
constitutional values, to foster voluntary religious practices--all permis-
sible "secular" purposes; and the effect of the government action-to
restore the burdened group to a preexisting status quo. Thus, in any
situation in which an establishment clause violation is raised, the courts
must first determine whether a free exercise violation is involved: (a) if
the government action can be viewed as an action to remedy or avoid a
free exercise violation by the government; (b) if such government action
restores the status quo that existed before the infringement; and (c) if
the action goes no further than necessary to restore this status quo, that
is, to remedy the violation, then the action can be said to have both a
proper purpose and a proper effect and will not be a violation of the
establishment clause. Furthermore, if the correction of the free exercise
violation results in any perceived undue entanglement of government
with religion, the burden will be on the government to devise a differ-
ent method for correcting the free exercise violation.
Given this application of the establishment clause test, no conflict
is possible when government action is taken to correct an infringement
on free exercise. Instead, the clauses are in a relationship of logical
priority. Two procedural conclusions result. First, the only analysis
pertinent under a free exercise claim is the applicable free exercise test
to determine whether there is an infringement of religious exercise and
if so, whether compelling governmental interests mandate such in-
fringement;120 and second, when an establishment clause claim is in-
voked, the court must first decide whether there is an underlying free
exercise claim and whether the contested activity can be seen as a rem-
edy of the infringement or an attempt to avoid the initial violation. This
latter approach is logically required because the free exercise test pro-
vides necessary data for the establishment test.
B. Application of the Non-Conflict Approach
The non-conflict approach can be used to reach the same results
mandated by the Supreme Court cases, but can do so in a manner
much more explicitly revealing of underlying assumptions and without
positing a conflict in the constitutional text. When the Court's free ex-
ercise analysis indicates impermissible infringements on religion, these
can be corrected without any danger of a conflict with the establish-
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963). See also Pfeffer's discussion of this test
as akin to the "clear and present danger" test used in free speech cases. L. PFEFFER,
supra note 74, at 500-03.
1so See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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ment clause as long as the corrective action does no more than restore
the religion to its unburdened position. For example, in Yoder,12 the
Court could not have ruled that public schools were required to provide
training in the Amish faith to Amish students, since this would have
advanced the religion beyond its original unburdened status.
In the establishment cases, the court must first decide whether
there is an underlying free exercise claim or the possibility of a free
exercise violation that government action sought to avoid. There may
have been such free exercise violations in those cases in which the Su-
preme Court found no establishment clause violations: Everson v.
Board of Education" (a claim that for the state to provide bus trans-
portation for public school students but not parochial school students
would be a free exercise violation); Zorach2 (a free exercise claim for
a faith to be allowed to provide weekly religious instruction to its mem-
bers' children); and Walz v. Tax Commission"" (a free exercise claim
not to be burdened with a duty to pay taxes that might harm the
religion).
Because the Court was not explicit in its analysis, it is also possi-
ble that the free exercise claim in these cases was rejected. Under these
circumstances, the standard three-part establishment clause test would
be applied to determine whether the government action, although not
required to remedy a free exercise violation, would be permitted.
Cases in which the Court upheld the establishment challenge indi-
cate (under the non-conflict approach) that any underlying free exercise
claim was found to be invalid (or, at least, the infringement was per-
missible). 25 In those cases, free exercise did not require, nor did estab-
lishment permit, the government action.
For sake of illustration, the theory will be applied to the Badoni
case and to two recent Supreme Court decisions, Widmar v. Vincent"26
and Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.
127
In Badoni, plaintiffs alleged that government actions infringed on
their free exercise of the Indian religion. It was then the role of the
court to evaluate those claims in light of the mandated free exercise
121 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
122 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
128 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
124 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
125 See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); School Dist.
of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962);
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
128 454 U.S, 263 (1981).
127 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982).
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analysis and to decide whether there was in fact such infringement, and
whether compelling state interests justified the infringement. 2
For the sake of argument, had a valid free exercise claim been
found, and had the government action restored the religion to its un-
burdened situation, the first two prongs of the establishment clause
test129 would be satisfied. The purpose of the government in protecting
the shrine areas would not be to foster Indian religion, but only to
remove an illegal impediment to religious practices.1' The effect would
similarly not be to advance or inhibit the religion. The religion would
be returned to its status before the government encroachment. Practi-
tioners would be free to worship as they chose, and the religion would
flourish or die solely through the faith of its adherents. Certainly no
members of the public would be coerced into joining the religion, espe-
cially since the effect of government action would be to deny access to
the public to view the private ceremonies.
Finally, there could be no excessive entanglement. If the courts
found government action (for example, keeping tourists out at certain
times) to be an excessive involvement with religion, one available alter-
native would be to require total removal of the government from the
land, i.e. returning the land to the tribes who could then police it them-
selves. In other words, once the government has unconstitutionally en-
tangled itself with religion, it cannot be argued that government efforts
to extricate itself or to alleviate the injustice would be forbidden be-
cause of excessive entanglement.
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.31 presents an interesting contrast
to Badoni. Plaintiffs in that case contested the validity of a Massachu-
setts statute which delegated to churches and schools veto power over
the issuance of a liquor license to an establishment within 500 feet of
the church or school. The Court ruled that the law failed the establish-
"' See supra note 119. A sensitive evaluation of the nature and needs of Indian
religions certainly might have revealed that the burden on free exercise was quite sig-
nificant. Further, since the "compelling" government interest involved recreational and
tourist facilities, the significant infringement might not have been justified.
a2 See supra text accompanying note 118.
SO Compare that to the purpose of AIRFA as expressed in a letter written by
Assistant Attorney General Patricia M. Wald. Wald stated that Senate Report No. 95-
709 made clear
that the resolution's purpose is 'to insure for traditional native religions
the same right of free exercise enjoyed by more powerful religions. How-
ever, it is in no way intended to provide Indian religions with a more
favorable status than other religions, only to insure that the U.S. Govern-
ment treats them equally.'
124 CONG. REC. 21,444 (1978).
131 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982).
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ment clause test because it delegated a governmental power (liquor
store licensing) to religious institutions, thus entangling government
with religion and creating the danger of divisiveness along religious
lines.1  The Court stated that a more valid approach to achieving the
same governmental purposes would have been an absolute ban on li-
quor outlets within reasonable distances from "churches, schools, hospi-
tals and like institutions." ' 3
In Grendel's Den there was no underlying free exercise violation
since government action had not burdened religion in any fashion. No
corrective action was therefore required and the purpose and effect of
the Massachusetts law must be examined independent of any free exer-
cise claims. Even assuming there had been a valid free exercise claim
requiring correction, the Massachusetts law went beyond restoring the
status quo and instead gave religious institutions broad discretionary
powers unnecessary to the correction of the violation.
The non-conflict approach reaches the same result as the Court,
but would do so by explicitly applying the free exercise analysis before
examining the establishment claims. Such an approach makes clear the
assumptions of the Court and prevents a reading of the two clauses as
conflicting.
Widmar v. Vincent 3 4 involved the decision by a state university to
exclude student religious groups from university meeting facilities
available to other student groups. The university argued that to allow
religious use of the state supported facilities would be a violation of the
establishment clause. The Court held that the university policy was an
impermissible content-based regulation of speech, and further stated
that an open forum policy would not be a violation of the establishment
clause since there would be merely an incidental benefit to religion and
no imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices.1 3 5
In his dissent, Justice White, who most directly addressed the un-
derlying free exercise claim of the excluded religious group, relied in
part on conflict analysis. He found there to be only a minimal burden
on religion, offset by the state's legitimate interest in avoiding establish-
ment problems and maintaining the separation between church and
state.1 38 Justice White's analysis suggests that a free exercise claim can
be struck down by an establishment claim.
In contrast, the non-conflict approach would first address the issue
12 Id. at 510, 512.
1 Id. at 510.
13 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
135 Id. at 273-74.
136 Id. at 288-89.
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of an underlying free exercise claim and ask whether the denial of
meeting privileges was an infringement of the free exercise rights of the
group. Such an infringement might be justified by a compelling state
interest-perhaps the need to limit use of the facilities to groups of a
certain size or the need to reserve the facilities for purely university-
wide functions-but would not be justified solely by a perceived need to
uphold the establishment clause. If an infringement existed and if there
were no compelling state interest to justify the burden, free exercise
requires that religious groups be permitted access to the facilities, and
establishment would permit such access. If no free exercise violation
existed, then the Court would apply its establishment analysis, looking
to other factors to determine purpose and effect. The majority opinion
in Widmar does not reach the issue of whether an underlying free exer-
cise violation existed but does state that the provision of benefits to a
broad spectrum of groups indicates primarily a secular effect.13 7 Under
the non-conflict approach this could be interpreted to mean that if the
university's grant of privileges to religious groups (along with secular
groups) was an effort to avoid a free exercise burden, then the effect
(and purpose) of such policy would be simply to retain the status quo
in which religious groups are neither advanced nor inhibited and would
not be a violation of the establishment clause. The Court comes tanta-
lizingly close to examining the underlying free exercise claim as one
way to determine an establishment violation, but never does so
explicitly.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
There are four possible relationships between the two religion
clauses of the first amendment: (1) free exercise requires a government
action that establishment forbids; (2) free exercise requires action that
establishment permits; (3) free exercise does not require but establish-
ment permits such action; and (4) free exercise does not require and
establishment does not permit the action. Two and four are non-
problematic. It is one and three that create difficulties.1 8 The Court
137 Id. at 274. In Widinar, the Court found that to not allow religious groups to
use the facilities infringed free speech. Id. It is possible to argue that government action
designed to remedy the infringement of any constitutional right, not just free exercise,
can never violate the establishment clause.
13$ The comment has not dealt at all with situation (3). It could be argued that (3)
like (1) is an empty category, and if free exercise does not require, establishment will
not permit. The Court and commentators, however, have sometimes espoused an oppo-
site approach.
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that
has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either govern-
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has suggested that situation one (free exercise requires but establish-
ment does not permit) is possible and that in those circumstances, either
one or the other of the clauses will be dominant. It is the thesis of this
Comment that situation one does not exist since the two clauses can and
should be viewed as complementary, operating in a relationship of logi-
cal priority.
The difference in result between the non-conflict approach and an
approach that says the two clauses conflict but that the free exercise
clause is dominant" 9 is probably small. The non-conflict approach,
however, is more natural and less strained. It is not necessary to weigh
the two clauses to determine which one should "win out," nor is it
necessary to restrict the freedoms secured by either. Finally, it is always
desirable to interpret the Constitution as being internally consistent.
The approach developed in this Comment differs from Kurland's
strict neutrality approach1 40 in that the former allows the government
to take action based on religious classifications (if, of course, it does so
to rectify a free exercise infringement). It differs from Pfeffer's141 in
that it more clearly sets forth the logical priority of the clauses, rather
than simply relying on their common evolutionary development.
Three arguments were advanced for the non-conflict approach.
First, the underlying purposes of the establishment clause would be
served, and the dangers intended to be protected against would be
avoided by permitting free exercise violations to be rectified without
mentally established religion or governmental interference with religion.
Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for
play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise is exist without sponsorship and without interference.
Walz, 397 U.S. at 669. The Court further stated, "[t]he limits of permissible state
accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference man-
dated by the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 673.
This "benevolent neutrality" expressed in Walz has been interpreted as permitting
religious accommodation regardless of whether or not the free exercise clause would be
violated. Wheeler, Establishment Clause Neutrality and the Reasonable Accommoda-
tion Requirement, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 901, 932 (1977). It is sometimes referred
to as a "zone of legislative discretion," the area between the establishment and free
exercise clauses in which accommodation to religion is neither forbidden nor required.
Not only must the no-aid or neutrality concept be subordinated to the
necessities of free exercise, but an area of legislative discretion must be
allowed where a state may choose to advance the cause of religious free-
dom even at the expense of not being completely neutral. Indeed this may
be described as the larger or benevolent neutrality.
Kauper, supra note 59, at 75. See also, Note, Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair
Aerospace Division: First Amendment Establishment Clause Challenge to Title VII's
Mandated Accommodation of Religion, 76 Nw. U.L. Ruv. 487 (1981).
1"I See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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fear of violating the establishment clause.
Second, the importance of the free exercise clause lies in the pro-
tection it affords to minority religions-protection from both deliberate
government attempts to eradicate religion and general policies that en-
croach in an insensitive manner on the free exercise of religious
groups.142 The dangers averted by the establishment clause are most
likely to arise when the majority religion attempts to benefit itself, since
government efforts are highly unlikely to attempt to advance (as op-
posed to unburden) the religions of minority groups. The dangers un-
derscored by the establishment clause are thus not present when the
government steps in to alleviate a burden on the free exercise of reli-
gion. The court implicitly has taken just such an approach in various
cases in which it permitted exemptions from laws of general applicabil-
ity on the basis of religion. 43
Finally, the non-conflict approach is mandated by the logical rela-
tionship of the two clauses. The free exercise determination reveals the
purpose and effect of a government law, information necessary for per-
forming the mandated establishment clause test. In all circumstances in
which an establishment clause claim has been raised, the court must
therefore determine first, whether the government action was intended
to rectify a valid free exercise claim, and second, whether the action did
no more than restore the status quo and return the religion to its un-
burdened position.
Unfortunately the Court has never explicitly articulated this non-
conflict approach, and lower courts have been left with a test so flexible
in nature that it can be used to strike down valid free exercise claims.
Such a use of the establishment clause in effect allows the courts to
avoid a careful analysis of the free exercise claim and the difficult pro-
cess of determining whether an infringement is allowable by virtue of a
compelling state interest. In a sense that is an abrogation of the respon-
sibility of the courts. Rather than stating the priorities outright-e.g.,
the needs of tourists and recreation facilities outweigh the burden im-
posed on minority religions-the courts have been able to avoid making
that statement by claiming that any corrective action would violate the
establishment clause. That use of the establishment clause not only vio-
lates the underlying purposes of the two religion clauses but allows the
142 Indians are an example of such a religious minority, burdened with a long
history of government efforts that have all too often been successful in eradicating the
Indian way of life. Thus, Native Americans are precisely that category of people who
come under the special protection of the free exercise clause, those minorities whose
religious interests will not entirely be protected by the political process.
143 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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majority to*infringe upon the religious needs of the minority group
without admitting the value judgments involved."'
A non-conflict approach would not permit such use of the estab-
lishment clause when a legitimate free exercise claim is involved, but
instead would require the courts to apply a full and stringent free exer-
cise analysis and to state openly their conclusions so that they could be
assessed through the judicial and political processes. Such an approach
prevents the courts from justifying a burden on minority rights under
the guise of constitutionalism.
14 Compare the remarks of Rep. Udall on the purpose of AIRFA: "It is the
intent of this bill to insure that the basic right of the Indian people to exercise their
traditional religious practices is not infringed without a clear decision on the part of the
Congress or the administrators that such religious practices must yield to some higher
consideration." 124 CONG. REc. 21,444 (1978).
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